Archive for category Libertarian Theory

Do Libertarians Need an Incompleteness Theorem?

Stephan Kinsella, a contributor to the libertarian web site, LewRockwell.com, has written an (as usual) interesting and provocative column entitled, "How We Come to Own Ourselves". I can’t summarize it in a few words, so please go and read it. It’s about the fundamental property right on which other property rights depend.

The discussion comes down to the difficult question, for libertarian theory, of who owns a baby. Kinsella cites and examines a number of arguments about this, which illustrate the difficulty of the question. None of them are ultimately convincing, neither to me nor, it appears, to him.

But his article does raise a more general problem — does any theory answer every question? Kinsella’s column shows what happens when you try to squeeze everything under the cover of one theory. In this case, according to libertarian theory, the world is divided up into 2 classes — things that are owned and things that are not owned. Where do you put a baby? Do its parents own it? After all, ownership is defined by the ability to control something. So is a baby owned? When does a person own himself?

I think the problem is like that faced by mathematicians and logicians up until 1931 when Kurt Gödel, in his famous "incompleteness theorem", showed that, if you attempt to divide any universe of mathematical theorems into 2 classes — TRUE and FALSE — you find that there are theorems that are undecidable, i.e., you cannot prove that they are TRUE or FALSE. So, perhaps libertarian theory cannot answer the question of whether a baby falls into the "owned" class or into the "unowned" class. There may be many things in the world that do not fit neatly into either of these categories.

Theoretical constructs are made about a limited set of circumstances. They cannot cover every event in the universe. Though it is possible to talk about something like a baby in terms of ownership, it is also possible to talk about elections in terms of quantum theory. It just doesn’t make a great deal of sense. Perhaps we need an Incompleteness Theorem for libertarianism or, at least, try not to stretch or twist libertarian theory too far.

Ya think?

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Austrian Economics – A Critique, Part I

The great libertarian philosopher and economist, Murray Rothbard, student of Ludwig von Mises, wrote extensively about an axiomatic approach to understanding economics.The idea is that sound (i.e., true) economic principles are logically deducible from a small set of axioms (perhaps just one) in the same way that true theorems about geometry can be deduced from a small set of axioms (do I need to reference Euclid?). Mises called this deductive method, praxeology, and the method characterizes the Austrian school of economics. Here’s a quote from Rothbard taken from the praxeology.net web site:

Praxeology rests on the fundamental axiom that individual human beings act, that is, on the primordial fact that individuals engage in conscious actions toward chosen goals. This concept of action contrasts to purely reflexive, or knee-jerk, behavior, which is not directed toward goals. The praxeological method spins out by verbal deduction the logical implications of that primordial fact. In short, praxeological economics is the structure of logical implications of the fact that individuals act. This structure is built on the fundamental axiom of action, and has a few subsidiary axioms, such as that individuals vary and that human beings regard leisure as a valuable good. Any skeptic about deducing from such a simple base an entire system of economics, I refer to Mises’s Human Action. Furthermore, since praxeology begins with a true axiom, A, all the propositions that can be deduced from this axiom must also be true. For if A implies B, and A is true, then B must also be true.

I want to take issue with the method. I do so on two grounds. The first is the famous incompleteness theorem of Kurt Gödel. In this work, Gödel proved that, in any complex axiomatic mathematical system there are propositions (theorems) that cannot be proved or disproved within the axioms of the system. He also demonstrated that the consistency of the axioms (i.e., whether or not they are contradictory) cannot be proved. His work, by the way, ended a century of attempts to find the axioms which would put the whole of mathematics on an axiomatic basis.

The second ground is more practical: What appear to be perfectly logical steps in trying to demonstrate something, may be incorrectly applied and lead to a false conclusion.

Let me first illustrate the second ground. The following diagram represents an attempt to prove something patently false, namely, that an acute angle equals a right angle. We use Euclid’s axioms and theorems.

diagram

Let’s start by constructing the right angle, ABC. We then construct the acute angle, BCF, at the end of the line, BC. We then measure off equal distances (using a compass) BD and CE and draw a straight line from D to E. Using our compass, we then construct the perpendicular bisectors of BC (shown in green) and DE (shown in red). Since DE is not parallel to BC, these bisectors meet at a point, O. Then we draw the straight lines, DO, BO, CO and EO.

Since the point, O, is on the perpendicular bisector of the line, DE, then DO = EO. This is indicated by the short, single, purple mark on these 2 lines. Similarly, since O is on the perpendicular bisector of BC, then BO = CO and this is shown by the double mark on these lines. BD = CE by construction; triple purple mark on these lines.

We have now demonstrated, by one of Euclid’s theorems, that triangle DOB is congruent to, or equals, triangle EOC. Maybe they don’t look quite congruent, maybe our drawing technique is off a little, but that is logically the case. Since the corresponding parts of congruent triangles are equal, angle ABO = angle FCO (green). Since triangle OBC is an isosceles triangle, angle OBC = angle OCB (red), again by a Euclidian theorem (base angles of an isosceles triangle are equal).

And now the punchline. Axiom: if equals are added to equals, the results are equal. So, if we add angle ABO to angle OBC, the result must be equal to adding angle FCO to angle OCB. But, if we add angles ABO and OBC, we get angle ABC, a right angle. And, if we add angles FCO and OCB, we get angle FCB, an acute angle. Therefore, an acute angle equals a right angle. QED.

“BFD”, I hear you say. Hmmmm. Well, OK. But we (Isn’t it cute how I have insinuated that “we” in here; now you’re complicit in this stuff, too!). Where was I? Oh, yes … we have used the axiomatic method, quite properly, and wound up with a result which is obviously false. There is no mistake in the axioms or the logic. So how is this possible? Can this type of fallacy arise in trying to deduce economic principles from the praxeological axiom of action?

———- to be continued ———–

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Libertarian Dilemmas #1

My daughter who, for some reason (gotta keep the old man happy?), has been reading this blog, has suggested that I should get into politics; i.e., run for office. She apparently thinks that I don’t have enough to do. (Aside: She was in politics as an aide to a U.S. Senator in the area of science. Then she went on to be involved in the White House’s environmental policy decision-making. But she got sick of the D.C. political scene and quit.) So now, as I said, she’s encouraging me to get involved at the local political level. She even said, “Yes,” when I asked her if she would be my political advisor.

Well, I’m not interested in getting into party-style politics. But I bring this up because she raised a question about which libertarians disagree: should we get into the political scene by running for office? The disagreement revolves about a central issue in libertarian philosophy, the role of the state in society. There are 2 views on this subject, anarchist (there should be no state) and minarchist (the smallest possible state). If you are a minarchist (in a democracy or a republic) and then decide to participate in the political process, you are faced with the problem of compromise. Example: As a libertarian, I want no state regulations on what I can do with my property and I’m against taxes. If I were in Congress, would I vote for some tax increase in exchange for some other congressman’s vote to reduce state regulations on property use? In short, would I begin to compromise my beliefs and get co-opted by the system, which I don’t like in the first place? The Libertarian Party is constantly faced with this dilemma.

The argument in favor of joining the political process is that we cannot achieve our end, freedom, at one decisive, all-encompassing moment, an instant revolution. So let’s try to get there slowly by getting into politics. My personal view (subject to change as my brain deteriorates with age) is that it is better to stay out of politics and try to influence peoples’ thinking by, say, a web log. (How’s that for grandiosity?) If it is to work, it will require time and constant persuasion. Since the state is force, using the political process to effect change would be opposed to the fundamental libertarian principle of not initiating the use of force to get people to do what you want.

Then, if you are a minarchist, how do you keep the state as small as possible? The U.S. Constitution was supposed to be a description of all the powers that the Federal Government would have. All powers not specifically granted to the government by the Constitution were reserved to the individual states or to the people (Tenth Amendment). We have seen the abject failure of this attempt to limit government. It always tries to grow as pressures mount on politicians from all sides. However, you could imagine that, if the majority of politicians were libertarians, then they would keep the state from growing. Maybe.

Another problem for libertarians, perhaps the biggest one, is what to do about defense, both personal and national. I won’t start on that one here because it is such a huge issue. Another time.

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